Spin-Orbit Torque Devices for Hardware Security: From Deterministic to
  Probabilistic Regime by Patnaik, Satwik et al.
© 2019 IEEE. This is the author’s version of the work. It is posted here for personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive
Version of Record is published in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems.
Spin-Orbit Torque Devices for Hardware Security:
From Deterministic to Probabilistic Regime
Satwik Patnaik∗, Student Member, IEEE, Nikhil Rangarajan∗, Student Member, IEEE,
Johann Knechtel∗, Member, IEEE, Ozgur Sinanoglu, Senior Member, IEEE, and Shaloo Rakheja, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Protecting intellectual property (IP) has become
a serious challenge for chip designers. Most countermeasures
are tailored for CMOS integration and tend to incur excessive
overheads, resulting from additional circuitry or device-level
modifications. On the other hand, power density is a critical
concern for sub-50 nm nodes, necessitating alternate design con-
cepts. Although initially tailored for error-tolerant applications,
imprecise computing has gained traction as a general-purpose
design technique. Emerging devices are currently being explored
to implement ultra-low-power circuits for inexact computing
applications. In this paper, we quantify the security threats of
imprecise computing using emerging devices. More specifically,
we leverage the innate polymorphism and tunable stochastic
behavior of spin-orbit torque (SOT) devices, particularly, the
giant spin-Hall effect (GSHE) switch. We enable IP protection
(by means of logic locking and camouflaging) simultaneously for
deterministic and probabilistic computing, directly at the GSHE
device level. We conduct a comprehensive security analysis using
state-of-the-art Boolean satisfiability (SAT) attacks; this study
demonstrates the superior resilience of our GSHE primitive when
tailored for deterministic computing. We also demonstrate how
probabilistic computing can thwart most, if not all, existing SAT
attacks. Based on this finding, we propose an attack scheme called
probabilistic SAT (PSAT) which can bypass the defense offered by
logic locking and camouflaging for imprecise computing schemes.
Further, we illustrate how careful application of our GSHE
primitive can remain secure even on the application of the PSAT
attack. Finally, we also discuss side-channel attacks and invasive
monitoring, which are arguably even more concerning threats
than SAT attacks.
Index Terms—Hardware security, Imprecise computing, Prob-
abilistic computing, Reverse engineering, IC camouflaging, Spin-
orbit torque, Giant Spin-Hall effect, Boolean satisfiability.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE notion of imprecise computing already took root in1956, with the seminal work by von Neumann, where
the concept of error was introduced as an essential part of
any computing system, subject to thermodynamical theory [2].
Von Neumann further expounded on the control of errors
in simple automatons. In 2007, the ITRS report [3] stated
that “relaxing the requirement of 100% correctness [...] may
dramatically reduce costs of manufacturing, verification, and
test. Such a paradigm shift is likely forced in any case by
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Fig. 1. Interplay between accuracy, energy consumption, layout cost and
complexity, and security for probabilistic computing. For any design, imple-
menting larger parts using probabilistic logic helps to improve both the energy
consumption and the resilience against attack seeking to steal the underlying
intellectual property. However, this comes at the expense of reduced accuracy
and increased design complexity. In any case, the accuracy of probabilistic
gates can be tuned individually, which provides the designer with an additional
degree of freedom to exploit this interplay.
technology scaling, which leads to more transient and perma-
nent failures [...].” Apart from the escalating strain on Moore’s
scaling, imprecise computing is further incentivized by the
“big-data explosion” and the rise of machine learning. Both
require intensive and large-scale computation, yet typically
with some error tolerance, such that imprecise computing can
be leveraged [4], [5]. At present, imprecise circuits are pri-
marily tailored for error-tolerant applications including neural
networks, voice recognition, and video processing. However,
the proliferation and subsequent pervasiveness of imprecise
computing is expected in the near future, as designers have
already started to embrace computational errors as a means for
achieving stringent requirements in power- and data-intensive
computational systems [6], [7]. In this context, emerging de-
vices including nanowire transistors, carbon-based electronics,
spin-based computational elements, offer further reduction
in power consumption as well as higher integration density
compared to their CMOS counterparts [8].
Meanwhile, hardware security has become a major chal-
lenge due to concerns such as theft of design intellectual
property (IP), leakage of sensitive data at runtime (via side
channels or otherwise), counterfeiting of chips, or insertion
of hardware Trojans [9]. Recently it has been advocated that
emerging devices can augment CMOS technology to advance
hardware security [10]–[12], but very little focus has been
given to imprecise computing so far. Hence, it is crucial to
discuss hardware security in the context of imprecise comput-
ing systems, possibly built with emerging devices. Arguably
the most promising aspect of many emerging devices offered
toward hardware security is their functional polymorphism—a
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polymorphic gate can implement different Boolean functions,
as determined by an internal/external control mechanism [12].
In this work, we consider security as an essential design
variable for emerging devices, and we examine the interplay
between security, accuracy, layout cost and complexity, and en-
ergy (Fig. 1). Although multi-functionality and polymorphism
are inherent to spin-orbit torque (SOT) devices in general, we
provision the giant spin-Hall effect (GSHE) switch [13] here
without loss of generality, since the technology of spin-Hall
effect is more mature than other charge to spin conversion
devices currently [14], [15]. More specifically, we leverage the
GSHE switch demonstrated by Rangarajan et al. for energy-
efficient computing [16]. We extend the scope of this GSHE
switch toward hardware security, i.e., to build polymorphic
gates for IP protection. In doing so, we explore both the
deterministic and the probabilistic regime. While we choose
the GSHE switch as a representative polymorphic spin gate for
our work, the concepts presented in this paper can be extended
to other devices based on spin-orbit coupling and the inverse
Rashba-Edelstein effect, for instance the magnetoelectric spin
orbit (MESO) device [17], [18].
The structure and contributions of this paper can be sum-
marized as follows.
1) We review imprecise computing, hardware security, and
prior work in Sec. II. We note that most prior works suffer
from low security resilience and/or high layout cost.
2) We design a polymorphic, GSHE-based security primi-
tive in detail in Sec. III. The primitive provides strong
security capabilities—given two inputs, all 16 possible
Boolean functions can be packed within a single obfus-
cated instance. Besides, the primitive can readily support
deterministic and tunable probabilistic computing.
3) We elaborate on the protection provided by the primitive
against various attacks such as imaging-based reverse
engineering, side-channel attacks, and analytical SAT
attacks (Sec. IV). Regarding SAT attacks, we conduct
a comprehensive study (in the deterministic regime) to
benchmark our primitive against prior defense schemes,
which are mainly based on magnetic devices.
4) The immunity of probabilistic computing against SAT
attacks is explored in Sec. V. Most notably, here we
present an advanced SAT attack, called PSAT, which
allows tackling IP protection for probabilistic circuits.
Using conventional SAT and PSAT, we reveal the trade-
offs between accuracy, security, and energy for proba-
bilistic computing. Besides, we explore the resilience of
polymorphic circuits.
5) In Sec. VI, among other aspects, we outline the prospects
for protecting industrial circuits using a hybrid CMOS-
GSHE design style. We anticipate that our proposed
delay-aware protection can provide strong resilience
against SAT attacks with negligible layout overheads.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
A. Imprecise Computing
Three different branches of imprecise computing have
emerged, each leveraging unique techniques to harness noise
and error for energy-efficient design: (1) stochastic computing,
(2) approximate computing, and (3) probabilistic computing.
Stochastic computing is a paradigm that uses deterministic
logic blocks for computation, but random binary bit streams.
That is, the information is represented by statistical properties
of the random bit stream implemented in space and time [19],
[20]. This way, for example, multiplication can be achieved us-
ing a single AND gate, albeit with relatively low accuracy and
long processing times. Digital and analog blocks for stochastic
computing were introduced in [21], [22], and have since be-
come popular for not only parallel, error-tolerant applications
such as image-processing [23], neuromorphic computing [24],
but also for general-purpose low-power designs [6], [25].
Approximate computing is based on inexact logic for the
least significant bits (LSBs) of any binary operation. This
concept is implemented by altering the design at the circuit
level [19]. Using techniques such as logic reduction or pass
transistors with lower noise thresholds, approximate comput-
ing aims to forgo the accuracy of LSBs to reduce power
dissipation and circuit complexity [26]. However, note that
approximate computing does not leverage the potential for
non-determinism of the logic fabric itself. Low-power approx-
imate full adder, constructed by transistor reduction in mirror-
adder cells, and their application for signal processing were
discussed in [26], [27]. A design and optimization framework
for error and timing analysis of approximate circuits was
proposed in [28]. Authors in [29] design an energy-efficient
approximate neural network by selective replacement of least
significant neurons in the network with imprecise versions.
Probabilistic computing relies on noisy gates that exploit
the thermal randomness present in any computing system and,
hence, implement an inherently stochastic behavior [19]. Due
to the stochastic behavior, key design steps such as verification
are naturally more challenging than they are for determin-
istic computing [30]. Probabilistic computing with CMOS
logic is realized by using a noise source (often external),
which introduces metastability and error in the binary CMOS
switches [31]. Spintronic gates, such as the GSHE gate [13]
and the all-spin logic (ASL) gate [32], are intrinsically ran-
dom, without the need for external noise sources, due to
their stochastic magnetization dynamics [33], [34]. A detailed
study of probabilistic GSHE logic is presented in [16], which
quantifies the energy savings for various operating accuracies
and also outlines error models for complex logic gates.
B. Simple Case Study for Approximate Computing
Here, we present a simple case study illustrating the power-
accuracy trade-off in the GSHE device [16]. We follow the
fundamental rule of thumb for low-power approximate com-
puting, i.e., the most significant bits (MSBs) shall have a
higher priority than the LSBs while trading off computational
accuracy for power savings. By assigning probabilistic behav-
ior to the logic gates which only affect the LSBs, we restrict
the loss in computational accuracy.
Consider a 32-bit adder synthesized using GSHE gates that
initially operate deterministically. Now, the logic gates that
impact the computation of the LSBs—the lower 10 bits in
this example—can be made to behave probabilistically by
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Fig. 2. The ISCAS-85 benchmark c17 with three key gates: K1, K2, and K3.
operating them at sub-critical input currents [16]. Considering
an error rate of 10% for those gates, the worst-case error
for the 32-bit addition is only about 0.000024%, whereas
the power savings per gate are 50%, and in total about
5%. The GSHE gate in this work can be tuned to incur a
power consumption of 0.2125 µW for the deterministic regime
(Sec. III-B), whereas the same gate when operating with an
output accuracy of 90%, consumes only 0.1071 µW [16].
Note that this discussion covers only accuracy and power,
and the aspect of security will be introduced later.
C. Hardware Security
With the advent of globalization affecting the supply chain
of integrated circuits (ICs), hardware security has emerged as
a critical concern. The exposure to potential adversaries in
any of the third parties tasked for design, manufacturing, and
testing has escalated [9]. These adversaries may seek to (i)
reverse engineer (RE) the ICs, (ii) counterfeit the ICs, (iii)
steal the underlying intellectual property (IP), or (iv) insert
some hardware Trojans. Regarding the IP-centric threats, it
has been estimated that billions of dollars in revenue are lost
every year [35]. To mitigate these threats, several schemes have
been proposed; they are mostly based either on camouflaging,
logic locking, or split manufacturing.
Camouflaging seeks to mitigate RE attacks; wherein the
layout-level appearance of the IC is altered in a manner
such that it becomes intractable to decipher its underlying
functionality and IP [36]. For CMOS integration, various
techniques have been proposed, e.g., look-alike gates [37],
threshold-voltage-dependent (TVD) camouflaging [38], [39],
and camouflaging of the interconnects [40]. Emerging devices
have been recently considered for camouflaging as well, e.g.,
in [41]–[44]; see also Sec. II-E and Sec. III-B.
Logic locking (also known as logic encryption) obfuscates
the IP functionality rather than the device-level layout [45]–
[47]. Here, the designer obfuscates the netlist by inserting
additional key gates such that the original functionality can
only be restored once the correct key bits are applied. The
key bits are programmed into a tamper-proof memory after
fabrication; this is to hinder attacks during manufacturing
time as well as in the field. However, realizing tamper-proof
memories is a practical challenge [48], [49]; emerging spin
devices can be promising here as well [10].
Analytical attacks targeting camouflaged (or locked) ICs
were initially introduced in [50], [51]. Most analytical attacks
are based on some notion of Boolean satisfiability (SAT)
where a relatively small set of discriminating input patterns
(DIPs) may suffice to resolve the functionality of camouflaged
gates (or locking keys); see also Sec. II-D. Several SAT-attack
resilient techniques were recently proposed, e.g., [46], [47],
[52]. These works seek to impose exponential computation
complexity for the SAT solver. Still, most of these techniques
are vulnerable to some degree when subject to tailored attacks
such as [53]–[55]. Besides, we note that prior art on SAT
attacks tender exclusively to deterministic computing and
circuits. In this paper, among other contributions, we extend
the scope of SAT attacks to probabilistic circuits.
Physical attacks range from non-invasive (e.g., power side-
channel attacks) and semi-invasive (e.g., localized fault-
injection attacks) to invasive attacks (e.g., RE, microprobing
the frontside/backside) [56]. While such attacks require more
sophisticated tools and know-how than analytical attacks, their
potential is widely acknowledged to be more severe. Such
attacks are also promising for extracting sensitive data at
runtime, even from secured chips, e.g., [57], [58].
D. Boolean Satisfiability and Related Attacks
The problem of Boolean satisfiability (SAT) is an NP-
complete problem that determines if a given propositional
Boolean formula, usually expressed in its conjunctive normal
form (CNF), can be satisfied by any combination of values
assumed by the variables of the formula [59]. In case one
or more such combinations result in a “true” evaluation of
the Boolean formula, then it is termed satisfiable and other-
wise, unsatisfiable. A SAT solver is based on an algorithm
which heuristically sweeps through the solution space of the
Boolean formula to check if any particular combination of
variable assignments can satisfy the formula. Such SAT solvers
have become quite prevalent for combinatorial optimization,
software verification, and cryptanalysis applications [60], [61].
More recently, SAT solvers have also been tailored for the field
of hardware security, namely to resolve/attack logic-locked or
camouflaged circuits [50], [51], [53], [62], [63]. Such SAT
attacks are successful once the attacker can resolve the key
bits of the locking scheme or the functionality of all the
camouflaged gates. Note that the various possible, obfuscated
functionalities for camouflaging can be modeled as key bits
as well. In other words, camouflaging and logic locking are
interchangeable in terms of analytical modeling [62], [64].
Next, we provide a simple example that illustrates how SAT
attacks decipher a locked netlist in general, namely by repeated
iterations over the key space. Consider the benchmark circuit
c17 shown in Fig. 2, which has been locked with three key bits:
K1, K2, and K3. Now, the attack procedure is to stepwise fix a
particular input pattern and then iterate over various possible
keys, eliminating those whose variable assignments cannot
satisfy the Boolean formula. For example, in Table I, the input
pattern “00100” is chosen (either randomly or heuristically)
in the first iteration. The corresponding output is “00”, as
obtained from an oracle (i.e., a working chip queried with
the input). Accordingly, some keys cannot result in satisfiable
assignments, namely k0, k2, k3, k5, k6, and k7. These keys are
pruned, and in the same way, the second iteration prunes key
k4. This leaves k1 as the last remaining key, which is returned
as the attack solution.
It is important to note that the outlined attack flow remains
purposefully generic and abstract. Actual SAT attacks all
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TABLE I
SAT ATTACK ON THE BENCHMARK c17, LOCKED AS IN FIG. 2
Input
Patterns
Oracle
Output Output for Different Key Combinations Inference
I1I2I3I4I5 O1O2 k0 k1 k2 k3 k4 k5 k6 k7
00000 00 01 00 10 11 00 01 10 11
00001 01 00 01 10 11 01 00 10 11
00010 11 10 11 01 00 10 11 00 01
00011 11 10 11 00 01 10 11 01 00
00100 00 01 00 10 11 00 01 10 11 Iteration 1: k0, k2, k3, k5, k6, k7 are pruned
00101 01 00 01 10 11 01 00 10 11
00110 11 10 11 01 00 10 11 00 01
00111 11 10 11 00 01 10 11 01 00 Iteration 2: k4 is pruned ⇒ k1 is inferred as correct key
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11111 10 11 10 10 11 11 10 10 11
Labels k0–k7 represent all possible combinations of key bits, from 000 to 111, and columns denote the corresponding outputs. k1 is the correct key.
apply various heuristics and techniques to efficiently tackle
the solution space, avoiding brute-force behavior. Interested
readers are referred to [50], [51], [53], [62], [63].
E. Prior Art and Limitations
Now, we briefly review some prior art and their limitations.
A more detailed comparison in terms of power and delay,
and (lack of) resilience against SAT attacks are provided in
Sec. III-B and Sec. IV-C (Table VII), respectively.
In [41], Zhang et al. implemented a low-power and versatile
gate using a GSHE-based magnetic tunnel junction (MTJ)
as the basic switching element. However, this device is not
explicitly tailored for security; it is unable to support logic
locking by itself, as it is not polymorphic. More concerning is
the limitation to only four possible Boolean functions, which
renders this primitive weak against SAT attacks.
Alasad et al. [42] use ASL to design three different security
primitives, supporting three sets of camouflaged functionali-
ties: INV/BUF, XOR/XNOR, and AND/NAND/OR/NOR. The
layouts of the three primitives are unique; they can be readily
distinguished by imaging-based RE tools, which also eases
subsequent SAT attacks. Besides, the primitives suffer from
relatively high power consumption of ∼ 350 µW at ns delays.
Winograd et al. [43] introduced a spin-transfer torque
(STT)-based reconfigurable lookup table (LUT), explicitly
addressing hardware security. However, their approach falls
short regarding resilience against SAT attack. Since the authors
did not report on any SAT attack themselves, we conducted
exploratory experiments ourselves. For example, we protect
the ITC-99 benchmark s38584 according to their scheme and
observe that the resulting layouts can be decamouflaged in less
than 30 seconds (i.e., average SAT runtime over 100 runs of
random gate selection according to [43]). This weak resilience
stems from the limited use of their STT-LUT primitive to curb
power, performance, and area (PPA) overheads.
Yang et al. [44] recently proposed an SOT-based design for
reconfigurable LUTs. Their concept is tailored for obfuscation;
it can support all 16 possible Boolean functions for two
inputs, like ours. However, the authors neglect powerful SAT
attacks. Based on overly optimistic assumptions regarding the
attacker’s capabilities (presumably to curb PPA cost as well),
the authors limit their study to the obfuscation of 16/32/64
gates. In experiments similar to those we conducted for [43],
we found that such small-scale obfuscation is easily resolved.
As for CMOS-centric camouflaging, most schemes are static
(i.e., not polymorphic) and tend to incur a high layout cost.
For example, the static look-alike NAND-NOR-XOR gate
proposed by Rajendran et al. [37] induces overheads of 4× in
area, 5.5× in power, and 1.6× in delay (compared to a regular
two-input NAND gate). The TVD full-chip camouflaging as
proposed in [39] still induces overheads of 14%, 82%, and
150% in PPA, respectively. As a result, such schemes are
limited to a cost-constrained and selective application, which
has severe implications for security (Sec. IV).
Finally, we acknowledge that Koteshwara et al. recently pro-
posed dynamic obfuscation at the system level [65], albeit their
work focuses only on CMOS implementation. We anticipate
that inherently polymorphic gates, such as the GSHE device,
can advance such a scheme. Furthermore, McDonald et al. [66]
advocate runtime polymorphism for IP protection, albeit with-
out any security analysis using SAT attacks and without any
implementation details toward polymorphic devices.
III. DESIGN OF A GIANT SPIN HALL EFFECT (GSHE)
SECURITY PRIMITIVE
Protection schemes based on emerging devices can be com-
petitive, even when compared to regular, unprotected CMOS
circuits. Leveraging GSHE is one approach among many to
realize SOT-based magnetic devices. The GSHE switch has
been studied for a while, and its understanding is relatively ma-
ture. The SOT phenomena has been experimentally measured
in several magnetic and non-magnetic bilayers at 300K [67],
[68]. Likewise, the read-out mechanism in the GSHE device
has been experimentally demonstrated in similar magnetic
structures [69], [70]. Experiments are currently underway to
integrate the read and write circuitry in the GSHE device to
realize Boolean logic [14], [15].
Note that truly polymorphic gates such as the GSHE switch
can inherently support both camouflaging and locking due to
the following reasons. First, owing to their uniform device-
level layout, the actual function of a polymorphic gate is hard
to determine from its physical implementation, particularly
when optical-imaging-based RE techniques are used. Second,
the actual function is dependent on control currents and
voltages, which can act as key inputs. Hence, the notions
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Fig. 3. Structure of the GSHE switch. The concept is derived from [16], but
here we adopt a stacked integration to maximize the dipolar coupling.
of locking and camouflaging are used interchangeably in the
remainder of this work.
A. Structure and Operating Principle of the GSHE Switch
The GSHE switch, which is at the heart of the proposed
primitive, is constructed by combining a heavy-metal spin-Hall
layer, such as tantalum, tungsten, platinum or palladium, with
a magnetic tunnel junction (MTJ) arrangement (Fig. 3). Above
the heavy-metal layer are two nanomagnets for write and read
modes (W-NM and R-NM, red). The W-NM is separated from
the output terminal via an insulating oxide layer (green). On
top of the R-NM sit two fixed ferromagnetic layers (dark
green) with anti-parallel magnetization directions.
The switch relies on the spin-Hall effect [71] for generating
and amplifying the spin current input, and the magnetic dipolar
coupling phenomenon [72] to magnetically couple R-NM and
W-NM, while keeping them electrically isolated. Thereby, the
R-NM and W-NM are coupled. A charge current through the
bottom heavy-metal layer (along xˆ) induces a spin current in
the transverse direction (along yˆ), which is used to switch the
magnetization state of the W-NM. The dipolar coupling field
then causes the R-NM to switch its orientation. That is because
in the presence of magnetic dipolar coupling, the minimum
energy state is the one in which the W-NM and the R-NM are
anti-parallel to each other [13]. The final magnetization state
of the R-NM is read off using a differential MTJ setup. The
logic (1 or 0) is encoded in the direction of the electrical output
current (+I or -I). The current direction depends on the relative
orientations of the fixed magnets in the MTJ stack with respect
to the final magnetization of the R-NM. The parallel path
offers a lower resistance for a charge current passing either
from the MTJ contact to the output terminal or vice versa
(i.e., from the output terminal to the MTJ contact). Hence,
depending on the polarity of the read-out voltage applied to
the low-resistance path (i.e., either V+ or V−), the output
current either flows inward or outward, representing the logic
encoding of the GSHE switch operation.
This basic GSHE device can readily implement a BUF
or INV gate (buffer or inverter operations). To realize more
complex multi-input logic gates, a tie-breaking control signal
X with a fixed amplitude and polarity is applied in addition
to the primary input signals at the input terminal. That is,
the input of the GSHE switch (or, more generally, any SOT-
driven magnetic switch) is additive in nature. The polarities
of the control signal and the MTJ voltage polarities are used
Fig. 4. The current-centric truth tables for NAND and NOR functionalities,
with inputs A and B (X is a control signal). As always the case for our
GSHE-based primitive, logic 1/0 is represented by an output current +I/-I.
to permute between different Boolean operations (Fig. 4). See
also Sec. III-C and its Fig. 8 for all 16 possible Boolean gates.
The GSHE switch is a noisy polymorphic device, whose
probability for output correctness depends on the input spin
current’s amplitude and duration, i.e., the outputs generated
by the previous logic stages. In general, the control signal
X is used to set the functionality for any current stage (nth
stage), and the output correctness probability for each next
stage ((n+ 1)th stage) is as follows [16]:
Pn+1correct = Pflip
(
IsX + Σ
Ninput
i
β∆Gni V
n
i
1 + rGni
)
[f ] + 1. [1− f ] (1)
where Pflip is the probability for flipping of the W-NM in
the (n + 1)th stage’s GSHE switch. This probability itself is
a function of the current supplied by the nth stage and the
magnitude of the control spin current IsX. The relationship
between the output current of a particular stage and the voltage
supply in the MTJ arrangement of that stage is according
to [16], wherein β is the spin-Hall current amplification factor,
Gn is the MTJ conductance for the nth stage, V n is the MTJ
voltage for the nth stage, and r is the resistance of the spin
Hall layers. The function f represents the Boolean function to
be implemented, and establishes the condition for flipping of
the magnetization state.
B. Characterization and Comparison of the GSHE Switch
The layout of the GSHE switch (Fig. 5) is drawn based on
the design rules for beyond-CMOS devices [8], i.e., in units
of maximum misalignment length λ. The area of the GSHE
switch is accordingly estimated to be 0.0016µm2.
The material parameters for the GSHE switch considered
are given in Table II. A spin current (IS) of at least 20µA is
required for deterministic computing, as compared to the sub-
critical currents sufficient for probabilistic computing [16].
The performance of the switch is determined by the nano-
magnetic dynamics, which is simulated using the stochastic
Landau-Lifshitz-Gilbert-Slonczewski equation [34]. Simulated
delay distributions are illustrated in Fig. 6, and these distribu-
tions are computed using a CUDA-C model [16]. For the prop-
agation delay for deterministic computing, we subsequently
assume a mean delay of 1.55 ns as obtained for IS = 20 µA,
whereas for probabilistic computing, we consider a mean delay
of 4.5 ns as obtained for IS = 15 µA. Further, this delay was
then used to construct a behavioral Verilog model to obtain
transient responses (Fig. 7).
The power dissipation for the read-out phase is derived
according to the equivalent circuit shown in Fig. 5 (inset).
Using the following equations and the parameters listed in
Table II, the power dissipation of the GSHE switch for de-
terministic computing, including leakage, is derived as 0.2125
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Fig. 5. The layout of the GSHE switch constructed according to the design
rules for beyond-CMOS devices formulated in [8]. Inset shows the equivalent
circuit of the GSHE switch, derived from [13]. The power dissipation in the
equivalent circuit is dictated by the resistance r of the heavy metal as well
as the conductances of the anti-parallel, high-resistance path (GAP ) and the
parallel, low-resistance path (GP ) composed of the fixed ferromagnets.
TABLE II
MATERIAL PARAMETERS OF THE GSHE SWITCH
Parameter Value
Volume of nanomagnets (NM) (28× 15× 2) nm3 [16]
Saturation magnetization MS of NM
106 A/m (W-NM) [16]
5× 105 A/m (R-NM) [16]
Uniaxial energy density Ku of NM
2.5× 104 J/m3 (W-NM) [16]
5× 103 J/m3 (R-NM) [16]
Spin current IS, determ. switching 20 µA [16]
Resistance area product RAP 1 Ωµm2 [73]
Tunneling magnetoresistance TMR 170% [73]
Parallel conductance GP 420 µS
Anti-parallel conductance GAP 155.6 µS
Resistivity of heavy metal (HM) ρ 5.6× 10−7Ω–m
Spin-Hall angle θSH of HM 0.4 [74]
Thickness tHM of HM 1 nm
Internal gain β of HM 0.4× (15 nm/1 nm)
β = θSH × (wNM/tHM) = 6
Resistance r of HM ≈ 1 kΩ
µW. For probabilistic computing, power dissipation is even
lower, namely ∼ 0.12 µW.
P =
V 2OUT
r
+ (VSUP − VOUT)2GP + (VOUT + VSUP)2GAP (2)
VSUP =
∣∣∣V +/−∣∣∣ = (IS
β
)(
1 + r(GP +GAP)
GP −GAP
)
(3)
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Fig. 6. Delay distributions for the GSHE switch at various spin currents (IS ),
obtained from 100,000 simulations each. Note that the spread and mean delay
diminish with increasing IS , however, at the cost of higher power dissipation.
Also note that for currents below 20 µA, probabilistic switching occurs.
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Fig. 7. Transient response for all input patterns applied for an example circuit
(right top). The critical path comprises three GSHE gates, which each exhibit
a mean delay of 1.55 ns (right bottom), hence the overall delay is 4.65 ns.
VOUT =
IS r
β
(4)
GP
GAP
= 1 + TMR; GP =
A(nanomagnets)
RAP
(5)
In Table III, we compare the GSHE switch against those of
existing deterministically driven devices, including ones that
are not necessarily security-oriented. Except for the silicon
nanowire device [11], the switch is superior in terms of en-
ergy/power. When compared to [11] (and CMOS devices, see
also Sec. III-D), the switch has a higher delay. In comparison
to the other emerging devices, however, the delay of the
GSHE switch can be considered competitive. That is especially
justified as most prior work does not discuss their peripherals;
see Sec. III-D for our peripherals. In any case, the switch can
serve to strongly protect industrial designs without inducing
significant delay overheads, as we show in Sec. VI-C.
As for security in terms of obfuscation, the number of pos-
sible functions is the relevant metric—here the GSHE switch
significantly outperforms most prior art. See also Sec. III-D
for a discussion on the contending SOT-based work of [44].
C. GSHE Security Primitive: Protecting the Design IP
The GSHE switch is leveraged for a simple but versatile and
effective security primitive—all 16 possible Boolean functions
can be cloaked within a single device (Fig. 8). In other words,
employing this primitive instead of regular gates can hinder
RE attacks of the chip’s design IP, without the need for the
designer to alter the underlying netlist. For example, to realize
NAND/NOR using this primitive, three charge currents are fed
into the bottom layer of the GSHE switch at once (Fig. 4 and
8): two currents represent the logic signals A and B, and the
third current (X) acts as the “tie-breaking” control input.
For some functions, the logic signals have to be provided as
MTJ voltages, not as charge currents. To transduce voltage into
charge currents (as well as obtain altering current polarities),
magnetoelectric (ME) transducers can be used [18], [76]. Such
transducers can be placed in the interconnects, and they are
capable of charge current conversion (i.e., +I to -I) and voltage
to charge current conversion (i.e., high/low voltages to +/-I)
and vice versa, with relatively little overhead (Table III).
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Fig. 8. All 16 possible Boolean functionalities for two inputs, A and B, implemented using the proposed primitive. If required, X serves as control signal,
not as regular input. Note that BUF and INV capture two functionalities each.
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF SELECTED EMERGING-DEVICE PRIMITIVES
(DETERMINISTIC REGIME)
Publication Functions (2 Inputs) Energy Power Delay
[11] SiNW NAND/NOR 0.05–0.1 fJ 1.13–1.77 µW 42–56 ps
[42, a] ASL NAND/NOR/AND/OR 0.58 pJ 351.52 µW 1.65 ns
[42, b] ASL XOR/XNOR 1.16 pJ 351.52 µW 3.3 ns
[42, c] ASL INV/BUF 0.13 pJ 342.11 µW 0.38 ns
[75] DWM AND/OR 67.72 fJ 60.46 µW 1.12 ns
[12] DWM NAND/NOR/XOR/ N/A N/A N/AXNOR/AND/OR/INV
[41] GSHE AND/OR/NAND/NOR N/A N/A N/A
[43] STT NAND/NOR/XOR/ N/A N/A N/AXNOR/AND/OR
[44] SOT All 16 N/A N/A N/A
GSHE (intrinsic) All 16 0.33 fJ 0.2125 µW 1.55 ns
GSHE + transducer All 16 0.45 fJ 0.2525 µW 1.8 ns
Obfuscated GSHE All 16 0.49 fJ 0.2673 µW 1.83 ns
(with MUXes)
The devices selected from prior art operate exclusively in the deterministic regime,
whereas the GSHE switch can also operate in the probabilistic regime. Besides, the
metrics quoted from prior art do not account for their peripheral circuitry. For ours, the
peripheral ME transducer is modeled according to [18], [76]. Peripheral MUXes are
characterized for the 15nm CMOS node using the NCSU FreePDK15 FinFET
library [77], and simulated for static camouflaging and a supply voltage of 0.75V using
Cadence Virtuoso. The area footprints are 0.003 µm2 for the GSHE device with
transducer and 0.029 µm2 for the obfuscated GSHE primitive with all MUXes.
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Fig. 9. Peripheral circuitry (the GSHE gate is laid out horizontally for
clarity). For protection against fab adversaries, the MUX control signals have
to connect to a tamper-proof memory or leverage split manufacturing.
Note that three wires must be used for the GSHE input ter-
minals (Fig. 5). This is to render the primitive indistinguishable
for imaging-based RE by malicious end-users, irrespective of
the actual functionality. Several functionalities leave some of
those wires unassigned (Fig. 8) which can, e.g., be imple-
mented as non-conductive dummy interconnects [40], [78],
especially if only static camouflaging is considered. However,
to support flexible input assignments, which is also essential
for polymorphic switching at runtime, we implement MUXes
as peripheral circuitry for all three input wires. (Fig. 9).
Similarly, MUXes are required for the voltage assignment for
the GSHE MTJ and the ME transducer.
To hinder fab-based adversaries, we outline two equally
promising options for secure implementation: (a) leverage split
TABLE IV
EXPLORATORY PROXIMITY ATTACK RESULTS FOR [85]
Benchmark Camouflaging (%) M6: CCR(%) / R/T(s) M8: CCR(%) / R/T(s)
ex1010 10 46 / 64 82 / 64
ex1010 20 36 / 138 59 / 103
ex1010 30 30 / 484 41 / 183
c7552 10 50 / 18 95 / 17
c7552 20 40 / 121 71 / 42
c7552 30 29 / 136 47 / 72
b14 10 22 / 1,457 41 / 141
b14 20 24 / 4,513 33 / 387
b14 30 26 / 13,293 37 / 777
b21 10 19 / 11,504 38 / 567
b21 20 28 / 43,646 40 / 1,489
b21 30 t-o / t-o 28 / 8,018
Average – 32 / 6,852 51 / 988
manufacturing [79], (b) provision for a tamper-proof memory.
For option (a), the MUX control signals shall remain protected
from the untrusted FEOL fab. Hence, the related wires have to
be routed through the BEOL, which is then manufactured by
a separate, trusted fab [79]. Recent studies have demonstrated
the practical application of split manufacturing [80], [81] and
guided routing within the BEOL for advancing split manu-
facturing [82], [83]. For option (b), a tamper-proof memory
holds a secret key that defines the correct assignment of control
inputs. The key is loaded into the memory post-fabrication by
the IP holder or authorized parties.
For option (a), fab-based adversaries may employ so-called
proximity attacks to try to recover the withheld BEOL routing
from various physical-design hints present in the FEOL [84],
[85]. We leverage the state-of-the-art attack provided by Wang
et al. [85] to conduct exploratory proximity attacks on our
scheme (Table IV). Here, we note the following. First, the
correct connection rate (CCR, which quantifies the BEOL
recovery) tends to decrease for larger obfuscation scales. For
practically relevant large scales (i.e., those which cannot be re-
solved later on by malicious end-users employing SAT attacks,
see Sec. IV), the attack by Wang et al. [85] furthermore incurs
excessive runtime (R/T). For example, for 30% camouflaging
of the benchmark b21, when split at M6, the attack cannot
resolve within 48 hours, resulting in time-out (t-o). Second,
the CCR tends to increase for higher split layers. Third, the
larger the design, the more challenging the attack. Overall,
while some BEOL wires can be correctly inferred, proximity
attacks are limited, especially when split at lower layers. These
findings are also confirmed by prior art [82], [85]–[88]. Finally,
also note that only we as designers, having full access to
the layout, can evaluate the attack, whereas any fab-based
adversary can only run the attack for a “best guess.”
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TABLE V
FULL-CHIP RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT IMPLEMENTATIONS
Regular Full-Chip Obfuscated
Benchmark Regular CMOS (15nm) Deterministic GSHE Deterministic GSHE
A(µm2) P(mW) D(ns) A(µm2) P(mW) D(ns) A(µm2) P(mW) D(ns)
c7552 222.51 0.68 0.28 2.66 0.22 57.61 26.05 0.24 58.74
b14 601.03 1.73 0.52 8.49 0.72 75.6 83.26 0.76 77.09
b20 1,283.16 3.56 0.64 19.07 1.61 55.8 186.89 1.69 56.91
b21 1,285.62 2.86 1.02 18.77 1.58 50.4 183.92 1.67 51.39
b22 1,910.88 3.65 1.43 28.99 2.44 72.0 284.18 2.58 73.42
Both options (a) and (b) represent a notable advancement
over prior work related to camouflaging, where the IP holder
must trust the fab because of the circuit-level protection
mechanism. In the remainder of this paper, we focus on the
threats imposed by malicious end-users.
D. Cost and Comparison of the GSHE Security Primitive
Recall that Table III covers the deterministic regime for the
GSHE device and the primitive (see also Fig. 9). The addition
of MUXes for the GSHE primitive incurs overheads of 8.9%,
5.8%, and 1.7% for energy, power and delay, respectively.
In Table V, we further report on area (A), power (P), and
delay (D) for selected benchmarks as obtained from Synopsys
Design Compiler, using the Nangate 15nm Open Cell CMOS
library [89] (at slow corner), the regular GSHE device (with
transducer), and the GSHE security primitive, respectively. For
the deterministic GSHE implementations, the APD metrics
derived above are leveraged for full-chip gate-level mapping,
i.e., each CMOS gate is assumed to be implemented as GSHE
gate. Accordingly, the results for the GSHE primitive represent
the case of full-chip obfuscation.
As indicated, the GSHE implementation is inferior to reg-
ular (i.e., unprotected) CMOS implementations concerning
delays. Considering Table III, this would also apply for other
prior art. Regarding area, the GSHE peripheral MUXes induce
∼ 8× additional cost compared to the regular GSHE imple-
mentation. However, considering absolute numbers, the area
for full-chip GSHE obfuscation is, on average, ∼ 7.3× smaller
than for the CMOS implementation of the same benchmark.
Here it is important to note that any camouflaging scheme to
be applied on the unprotected CMOS implementation would
further aggravate the related APD metrics. Besides, for purely
static camouflaging, the peripheral MUXes of the GSHE
primitive could be omitted, and the wiring for the functional
assignment can be implemented as a mix of real and dummy
interconnects. For example, Patnaik et al. [40] have shown
that such interconnect-based obfuscation can be implemented
even for full-chip camouflaging with moderate layout cost.
For the recent SOT-LUT-based camouflaging scheme pro-
posed by Yang et al. [44], we note the following. First, to
support all 16 possible functions while implementing an LUT,
their primitive requires multiple magnetic devices and related
peripheral circuitry. In contrast, our switch can implement all
16 functions within one device, with peripheral circuitry only
required for transduction and obfuscation purposes. Second,
the primitive in [44] is not inherently polymorphic; hence, it
can only support static camouflaging. Third, recall that the
authors obfuscated only 16/32/64 gates. We found empirically
that such small-scale camouflaging can be resolved by SAT
attacks, which is also confirmed by prior art [40], [62]. Fourth,
Yang et al. report only relative area and delay overheads
(power is not reported at all), but no absolute device-level
numbers (hence also the “N/A” labels in Table III). Their rela-
tive area and delay overheads are in the ranges of 14.23–25.8%
and 23.67–40.69%, respectively, for obfuscating only 16–64
gates. Considering that the authors leverage the relatively old
TSMC 0.35µm library, the related overheads per SOT-LUT
device could become prohibitive for large-scale camouflaging,
especially in the context of modern CMOS nodes (as we
consider for ours). Hence, we believe that our scheme can
be superior to that of [44].
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Here, we elaborate on the security of the GSHE primitive
against various end-user attacks. Most notably, a comprehen-
sive study for analytical SAT attacks is conducted, where we
benchmark our primitive against prior art. A key assumption
for the SAT attacks is that the GSHE primitive is applied in
the context of deterministic computing—we cover the security
analysis for probabilistic computing separately in Sec. V.
A. Threat Model
The malicious end-user is interested in resolving the un-
derlying IP implemented by the obfuscated chip. We consider
that an attacker possesses the know-how and has access to RE
equipment such as required for imaging-based RE. However,
the attacker does not have access to advanced capabilities for
invasive read-out attacks to, e.g., resolve the voltage and cur-
rent assignments for individual GSHE primitives at runtime.
(Even if so, such attacks seem practically challenging.)
In accordance with prior works, we assume that an attacker
procures multiple copies of the chip from open market; she/he
uses one for RE (which includes de-packaging, de-layering,
imaging of individual layers, stitching of these images and
final netlist extraction [90]), and another as an oracle to obtain
input-output (I/O) patterns. These patterns are then utilized for
SAT-based attacks. The attacker can also use the oracle chip
to evaluate side-channel leakage at runtime.
B. On Reverse Engineering and Side-Channel Attacks
1) Layout Identification and Read-Out Attacks: Recall
that the physical layout of the proposed primitive is uniform
(Sec. III); hence, it remains indistinguishable for optical-
imaging-based RE. It was also shown that dummy intercon-
nects can become difficult to resolve during RE, as long as
suitable materials such as Mg and MgO are used [78], [91]. A
more sophisticated attacker might, however, leverage electron
microscopy (EM) for identification and read-out attacks. For
example, Courbon et al. [58] used scanning EM, in pas-
sive voltage-contrast (PVC) mode, to read out memories in
supposedly secured chips. While such attacks are yet to be
demonstrated on switching devices at runtime, we believe that
the proposed primitive can thwart them for three reasons. First,
the dimensions of the GSHE switch are significantly smaller
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than CMOS devices, which is a challenge regarding the spatial
resolution for EM-based analysis [58]. Second, the primitive
readily supports probabilistic switching. This implies that once
an attacker can read-out the switch at runtime, she/he still has
to learn and account for the underlying error distributions.
Third, the primitive is truly polymorphic, and its functionality
may be switched at runtime; see also next.
2) Polymorphism at the System Level: Given the truly
polymorphic nature of the GSHE switch and assuming some
additional circuitry to switch their functionalities judiciously,
one can implement runtime polymorphism at the system level.
The gates’ functionalities are not static anymore, possibly even
for static input patterns, whereupon an attacker is bound to
misinterpret some parts of the layout—it seems impossible to
resolve all dynamic features on a full-chip scale at once.1
Besides hindering read-out threats, polymorphism at the
system level is also powerful to thwart SAT attacks. In fact, we
provide such a concept based on the GSHE switch in Sec. V-C.
3) Photonic Side-Channel Attacks: It is well known that
CMOS devices emit photons during operation, which makes
them vulnerable to powerful attacks [92], [93]. For example,
Tajik et al. [92] successfully conduct an optical read-out
attack against the bit-stream encryption feature of a Xilinx
Kintex 7 FPGA. Contrary to CMOS, the GSHE switch itself
does not emit any photons. The fundamentally different, mag-
netic switching principle thus renders the primitive inherently
resilient against photonic side-channel attacks. We caution
that a system-level assessment against such attacks shall be
performed nevertheless (once such chips are manufactured)
since additional circuitry may or may not remain vulnerable.
4) Magnetic- and Temperature-Driven Attacks: Ghosh et
al. [10] consider and review attacks on spintronic memory
devices using external magnetic fields and malicious temper-
ature curves. As for the GSHE switch, note that it is tailored
for robust magnetic coupling (between the W and R nanomag-
nets) [16], and this coupling would naturally be disturbed by
any external magnetic fields. Hence, an attacker leveraging a
magnetic probe may induce stuck-at-faults which are, however,
hardly controllable due to multiple factors: the very small
size of the GSHE switch, accordingly large magnetic fields
required for the probe, the state of the nanomagnets, the
orientation of the fixed magnets, and also the voltage polarities
for the MTJ setup. Temperature-driven attacks will impact the
retention time of the GSHE switch. The resulting disturbances,
however, are stochastic due to the inherent thermal noise in the
nanomagnets; fault attacks are accordingly challenging as well.
As a result, we believe that subsequent sensitization attacks to
resolve the obfuscated IP (e.g., as proposed in [37]) will be
difficult, if practical at all.
C. Study on Large-Scale IP Protection Against SAT Attacks
1) Experimental Setup: We model the GSHE primitive and
selected prior art [11], [12], [37], [38], [41]–[43], [94] as out-
lined in [62]. More specifically, we model the GSHE primitive
as follows. The logical inputs a and b are fed in parallel into
1For example, Courbon et al. [58] report that it took 50 ns to read-out one
pixel of one memory cell; this is well above the 1.55 ns switching speed for
the GSHE device for deterministic computing (recall Sec. III).
TABLE VI
CHARACTERISTICS OF SYNTHESIZED BENCHMARKS (ITALICS: EPFL
Suite [96]; BOLD: IBM Superblue Suite [97])
Benchmark Inputs Outputs Gates Benchmark Inputs Outputs Gates
aes_core 789 668 39,014 log2 32 32 51,627
b14 277 299 11,028 sb1 8,320 13,025 856,403
b21 522 512 22,715 sb5 11,661 9,617 741,483
c7552 207 108 4,045 sb10 10,454 23,663 1,117,846
ex1010 10 10 5,066 sb12 1,936 4,629 1,523,108
pci_bridge32 3,520 3,528 35,992 sb18 3,921 7,465 659,511
all 16 possible Boolean gates, and the outputs of those gates
are connecting to a 16-to-1 MUX with four select/key bits. As
for other prior art with less possible functionalities, a smaller
MUX with less key bits may suffice (e.g., for [37], a 3-to-1
MUX with two key bits is used). Although the GSHE primitive
inherently supports locking as well, here we contrast it only
to camouflaging primitives, without loss of generality. Besides
emerging-device primitives, we also contrast to CMOS-centric
primitives; this is meaningful since for any IP protection
scheme the resilience against SAT attacks hinges on the
number and composition of obfuscated functionalities [40],
[50], [51], not their physical implementation.
For a fair evaluation, the same set of gates are protected;
gates are randomly selected once for each benchmark, mem-
orized, and then the same selection is reapplied across all
techniques. We evaluate all techniques against powerful state-
of-the-art SAT attacks [50], [54], [95], run on an Intel Xeon
server (2.3 GHz, 4 GB per task allowed). The time-out (la-
belled as “t-o”) is set to 48 hours. We conduct our experiments
on traditional benchmarks suites, that is ISCAS-85, MCNC, and
ITC-99, but also on the large-scale EPFL suite [96] (and on
the industrial IBM superblue suite [97]; see Sec. VI for those
experiments). The benchmarks are summarized in Table VI.
2) Results: In Table VII, we report the runtimes incurred
by the seminal attack of Subramanyan et al. [50], [95]. While
there are further metrics such as the number of clauses, attack
iterations, or number of remaining feasible assignments [62],
runtime is a straightforward yet essential indicator—either an
attack succeeds within the allocated time or not.
We observe that for the same number of gates protected,
the more functions a primitive can cloak, the more resilient it
becomes in practice. More importantly, the runtimes required
for decamouflaging—if possible at all—tend to scale exponen-
tially with the percentage of gates being camouflaged.2
In comparison with prior art, our primitive induces by far
the largest efforts across all benchmarks. Except for ex1010,
none of the benchmarks could be resolved within 48 hours
once we protect 20% or more of all gates. To confirm this
superior resilience of our primitive, we conducted further
experiments running for 240 hours with full-chip protection
(100% camouflaging)—the designs could still not be resolved.
Moreover, we also observe some computational failures (e.g.,
“internal error in ‘lglib.c’: more than 134,217,724 variables”);
this hints at practical limitations about the scalability of SAT
attacks, as one can reasonably expect [51].
2Inducing prohibitive computational cost is also the primary objective for
provably secure schemes as in [46], [47], [52]. We further elaborate on
provably secure schemes versus our large-scale scheme in Sec. IV-C3.
10 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS
TABLE VII
RUNTIME FOR SAT ATTACKS [50], [95], ON SELECTED DESIGNS, IN SECONDS (TIME-OUT “T-O” IS 48 HOURS, I.E., 172,800 SECONDS)
Benchmark
10% IP Protection 20% IP Protection
[37] [38], [43] [11] [42, c], [94] [41], [42, a] [12] Our [37] [38], [43] [11] [42, c], [94] [41], [42, a] [12] Our
(3)∗ (6)∗ (4)∗† (2)∗ (4)∗ (7+1)∗‡ (16)∗ (3)∗ (6)∗ (4)∗† (2)∗ (4)∗ (7+1)∗‡ (16)∗
aes_core 610 4,710 890 132 536 6,229 25,890 4,319 41,844 11,306 407 9,432 t-o t-o
b14 2,078 20,603 11,465 6,884 17,634 27,438 60,306 56,155 t-o 64,145 8,426 t-o t-o t-o
b21 7,813 162,324 45,465 3,977 24,035 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
c7552 37 210 74 12 66 371 2,289 169 14,575 1,153 110 1,327 172,548 t-o
ex1010 62 215 82 12 73 295 922 171 1,047 274 38 250 1,310 4,701
log2 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
pci_bridge32 1,119 t-o 9,011 1,325 2,690 t-o t-o 54,577 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
30% IP Protection 40–100% IP Protection§
aes_core 17,148 t-o 31,601 2,020 26,498 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o 8,206 t-o t-o t-o
b14 56,787 t-o t-o 38,495 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
b21 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
c7552 1,786 t-o t-o 766 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o 41,721 t-o t-o t-o
ex1010 448 4,357 938 87 719 11,736 24,727 1,703 t-o 129,290 169—7,073§ 1,950 t-o t-o
log2 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
pci_bridge32 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
∗Number of cloaked functions; refer to Table III or the related publication for the actual sets of cloaked functions. Prior art covering the same set is grouped into one column.
†Here we refer to their camouflaging primitive, not the polymorphic gate reported on in Table III. ‡Here we also assume BUF to be available. §The benchmark ex1010 can be
resolved even for 100% IP protection, but only for the primitives of [42, c], [94]. The related runtime range is for 40–100% protection, whereas all other runtimes are for 40%
protection (50% protection or more ran into timeout).
TABLE VIII
RUNTIME FOR Double DIP ATTACKS [54], ON SELECTED DESIGNS, IN SECONDS (TIME-OUT “T-O” IS 48 HOURS, I.E., 172,800 SECONDS)
Benchmark
10% IP Protection 20% IP Protection
[37] [38], [43] [11] [42, c], [94] [41], [42, a] [12] Our [37] [38], [43] [11] [42, c], [94] [41], [42, a] [12] Our
(3)∗ (6)∗ (4)∗† (2)∗ (4)∗ (7+1)∗‡ (16)∗ (3)∗ (6)∗ (4)∗† (2)∗ (4)∗ (7+1)∗‡ (16)∗
aes_core 1,814 27,274 3,039 431 2,103 22,936 53,434 24,635 t-o 55,699 1,631 34,040 t-o t-o
b14 4,866 47,303 8,197 344 8,299 52,657 t-o 62,698 t-o 138,809 4,757 t-o t-o t-o
b21 14,671 t-o 84,483 2,095 47,937 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
c7552 58 763 153 19 173 1,919 23,632 639 t-o 31,485 199 111,580 t-o t-o
ex1010 126 470 194 27 153 627 1,897 396 3,280 628 94 560 4,361 11,660
log2 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
pci_bridge32 5,389 t-o t-o 6,888 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
30% IP Protection 40–100% IP Protection§
aes_core 59,487 t-o t-o 14,497 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o 28,228 t-o t-o t-o
b14 t-o t-o t-o 39,128 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
b21 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
c7552 t-o t-o t-o 22,521 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
ex1010 1,247 17,143 3,305 192 1,842 60,970 t-o 8,226 t-o 102,512 396—42,543§ 7,120 t-o t-o
log2 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
pci_bridge32 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
Refer to Table VII for footnotes.
We also apply Double DIP, provided by Shen et al. [54].
The key advancement of their attack is that it rules out at least
two incorrect keys in each iteration. Conducting the very same
set of experiments as before, we observe that the runtimes are
on average even higher across all benchmarks (Table VIII).
For example, decamouflaging the benchmark aes_core when
10% IP protection is applied using our primitive requires
≈7 hours for [50], but ≈15 hours for [54]. This implies
that Double DIP, while successful for protection schemes
such as SARLock [46], cannot cope well with our large-scale
camouflaging scheme. While Double-DIP is normally used to
reduce a compound defense technique (for e.g., SARLock +
SLL [46]) to its low-error-rate constituent by “peeling off”
the high-error-rate constituent, we apply it on our technique
anyways for the sake of a complete security analysis.
3) On Provably Secure Versus Large-Scale Schemes:
Contrary to provably secure schemes such as [46], [47],
[52], which are often backed by mathematical formulations,
one may find it difficult to engage in “plain” but large-
scale camouflaging. The reason is that the solution space
C, covering all possible functionalities of the design after
camouflaging, is hard to quantify precisely [50]–[52]. More
specifically, C depends on (i) the number and composition
of functions cloaked by each primitive, (ii) the number of
gates protected, (iii) the selection of gates protected, and
(iv) the interconnectivity of the design. Since all aspects are
interacting, SAT attacks may or may not be able to prune
C efficiently, but this can only be evaluated by running the
attacks. As shown above for [54], some heuristics can, in fact,
be counterproductive when tackling large-scale camouflaging.
Also recall that prior schemes are limited in both (i) and (ii)
by cost considerations (Sec. II-E).3 In contrast, thanks to the
innate polymorphism of the proposed GSHE primitive, we are
unbound toward large-scale camouflaging with all 16 possible
functionalities cloaked within one device.
3A massive interconnectivity may also impose a substantial cost, but more
importantly, most prior studies ignore the potential of obfuscating the intercon-
nects for IP protection to begin with. Patnaik et al. [40] proposed a dedicated
design flow for low-cost and large-scale obfuscation of interconnects.
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As a result, we believe that our scheme can be competi-
tive against provably secure techniques. In this context it is
important to also note that provably secure schemes have to
trade-off corruptibility and resilience against SAT attacks [53]:
the larger the desired resilience, the lower the corruptibility,
and vice versa. This trade-off implies that a high-resilience
scheme comes at the cost of effectively protecting only a small
part of the IP. For our scheme, however, these concerns are
inherently mitigated. That is, we can readily protect all of
the IP, and the resilience of our schemes relies on incurring
an excessive computational cost for the SAT solver (as also
discussed in [51], [98]), not on low corruptibility.
Overall, we are not claiming that large-scale camouflaging
cannot be resolved eventually using SAT or other attacks,
although limits for computation will remain in any case [51].
Rather, we provide strong empirical evidence that attacking
schemes as ours incurs prohibitive computational cost.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR THE PROBABILISTIC REGIME
So far we have leveraged the GSHE primitive in the context
of classical, deterministic computation. In this section, we
explore the implications of probabilistic computing for IP
protection, which have been largely ignored until now.
A. Conventional SAT Attacks on Probabilistic Circuits
Consider an obfuscated, hybrid circuit in which some of the
gates are probabilistic GSHE gates, while the rest are either
implemented in CMOS or as deterministic GSHE gates (see
also Sec. VI). Any probabilistic GSHE gate might function
erroneously at any point in time, possibly corrupting the
overall circuit output. When such a probabilistic circuit is
leveraged as an oracle, it might not always faithfully produce
the originally intended I/O patterns. Which of the individual
patterns is erroneous, however, remains incomprehensible to
an attacker who has yet to resolve the obfuscated functionality
of the circuit. Without a deterministic oracle to prune only
the incorrect keys, SAT attacks may observe conflicting hints
or falsely prune the correct key—a conventional SAT attack
inevitably tends to fail for probabilistic circuits.
As for a simple example, consider c17 of Fig. 2 again, but
assume that the gate X6 is being replaced by a probabilistic
GSHE NAND gate with an error rate of 5%. Since X6 impacts
the primary output O2, the oracle will produce correct outputs
only for 95% of all inputs. Now, for a conventional SAT attack,
such I/O errors can result in false pruning of keys (Table IX).
1) Experimental Setup: To verify this intuition, we pre-
pare the following experiments (with the setup described
in Sec. IV-C1 serving as a general baseline). Without loss
of generality, we pick c432 and c880 from the ISCAS-85
benchmark suite and apex4 and des from the MCNC suite. On
those circuits, we apply a simple obfuscation scheme, namely a
random insertion of 32 XOR/XNOR key gates. Note that such
simple obfuscation can be readily resolved for deterministic
circuits when using any SAT attack, especially for such rela-
tively small circuits. Next, we compile probabilistic versions
for those obfuscated circuits. To do so, we randomly select,
memorize, and replace fixed subsets of gates (50%, 20%, and
10% of all gates) with probabilistic GSHE gates. We model
the probabilistic gate behavior directly within the conventional
SAT attack by Subramanyan et al. [50], whose open-source
framework [95] allows for such customization. Note that we
provide our modification of [95], along with the probabilistic
benchmark versions, as open source as well [99].
We run our modified but conventional SAT attack [99]
10,000 times each on three different setups for the proba-
bilistic circuits, assuming error rates of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. For simplicity, we assign identical error rates for
all the probabilistic gates.4 Whenever an attack is successful,
we also evaluate the Hamming distance (HD) and output error
rate (OER) between the outputs of the original but probabilistic
circuit and the probabilistic circuit as resolved after the attack.
We apply 10,000 random patterns for averaging the HD and
OER (here and for all subsequent setups). It is important to
note that HD and OER provide a combined measure of error
for both the key inferred by SAT attacks and the probabilistic
nature of the circuits under consideration.
2) Results: The outcome of these experiments is presented
in Fig. 10. Besides the aspects discussed in Sec. IV-C3, here
we further note that the success rate for the conventional SAT
attack depends on (i) the number of probabilistic gates, (ii) the
type/function of those gates, and (iii) their error rates. As ex-
pected, the success rate decreases and the average HD inflates
once the error rates are ramped up. In fact, for some cases with
error rates of 5% or 10%, the success rate is even zero (and
for such cases, HD and OER cannot be calculated). In short,
when tackling obfuscated probabilistic circuits, the capabilities
of a conventional SAT attack are drastically reduced once the
correctness of the circuit is lowered.
This finding clearly illustrates the trade-off between cor-
rectness/accuracy and security. (Also recall Sec. II-B and
Sec. III-B for the trade-off between accuracy and power.)
Hence, whenever the designer seeks to forgo accuracy (typi-
cally to reduce power), the resilience against conventional SAT
attacks is inherently boosted at the same time.
B. PSAT: Our Probabilistic SAT Attack
Having demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the conventional
SAT framework against probabilistic circuits, here we present
our advanced attack, called PSAT. As indicated above, when
tackling probabilistic circuits, the main challenge for any SAT
attack is to correctly prune the search space despite potential
errors in the oracle’s output. An attacker cannot know in
advance which output patterns are erroneous (since the circuit
is obfuscated and, hence, initially of unknown functionality).
However, she/he can apply each input pattern multiple times,
track the statistical distribution of the output patterns, and
pick only the most prevailing outputs as ground truths while
pruning the search space during the SAT attack. The basis for
this assumption is that, in any probabilistic circuit, the overall
error rate should be constrained such that the correct output
patterns occur more frequently than incorrect ones. Otherwise,
the circuit would become too approximate and might behave
even arbitrarily at some point.
4Using our setup [99], one can, however, apply different error rates for
different gates, if considered useful for the design under consideration.
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TABLE IX
SAT ATTACK ON THE BENCHMARK c17, LOCKED AS IN FIG. 2, BUT WITH GATE X6 NOW ACTING PROBABILISTICALLY, WITH 5% ERROR RATE
Input
patterns
Oracle Output
0.95%/0.05% Most Probable Output for Different Key Combinations Inference
I1I2I3I4I5 O1O2 k0 k1 k2 k3 k4 k5 k6 k7
00000 00/01 01 00 10 11 00 01 10 11
00001 01/00 00 01 10 11 01 00 10 11
00010 11/10 10 11 01 00 10 11 00 01
00011 11/10 10 11 00 01 10 11 01 00
00100 00/ 01 01 00 10 11 00 01 10 11 Iteration 1: probabilistic oracle assumes incorrect output
⇒ k1, k2, k3, k4, k6, k7 are (falsely) pruned
00101 01/00 00 01 10 11 01 00 10 11
00110 11/00 10 11 01 00 10 11 00 01
00111 11 /00 10 11 00 01 10 11 01 00 Iteration 2: probabilistic oracle assumes correct output⇒ k1
pruned ⇒ k5 is inferred as (only seemingly) correct key
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11111 10/11 11 10 10 11 11 10 10 11
As in Table I, the labels k0–k7 represent all possible combinations of key bits, from 000 to 111, and the columns denote the corresponding, most probable outputs, which are
compared with the oracle output. The oracle output is now probabilistic.
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Fig. 10. Success rate, average HD, and average OER for 10,000 runs of conventional SAT attack [95], [99] applied on probabilistic versions of the ISCAS-85
benchmarks. The legend applies to all plots, and it represents the range of randomly selected probabilistic gates: 10%, 20%, and 50% of all gates, respectively.
The random selection is re-applied for all setups (including those in Fig. 11), for a fair comparison. Correctness is the inverse of the gate error rate; for each
setup, the respective correctness is constant for all probabilistic gates. For cases where the attack success rate is zero, HD and OER are not available.
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Fig. 11. Success rate, average HD, and average OER for 10,000 runs of our PSAT attack [99] applied on probabilistic versions of the ISCAS-85 benchmarks.
See also Fig. 10 for the setup and metrics.
Accordingly, the fundamental concept of PSAT is Monte
Carlo sampling. When querying the (probabilistic) oracle
during the incremental SAT attack flow, we apply each input
pattern 1,000 times, without loss of generality, and we track
all resulting outputs. Once this sampling is done, we sort
the various output patterns by their number of occurrence. In
case a dominant pattern is established, we readily select this
pattern as ground truth and proceed with the SAT attack. An
output pattern is considered dominant if and only if it occurs
at least as many times as the second and third most frequent
patterns combined. Otherwise, in case no dominant pattern is
observed, we randomly select among all observed patterns,
but while considering their occurrence statistics. For example,
if an output pattern has been observed for 27% of all oracle
queries using the same input, this particular pattern has a 27%
random chance to be selected as ground truth.
1) Experimental Setup: Similar as in Sec. V-A, we imple-
ment PSAT as an extension for the open-source framework
of [50], [95], and also here we release our PSAT extension
to the community as open source in return [99]. Along
with the core techniques of PSAT, we provide supplementary
features such as the conversion of regular gates to proba-
bilistic/polymorphic ones in the .bench file format, simulation
of probabilistic/polymorphic gates, the sampling of Hamming
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TABLE X
AVERAGE RUNTIMES FOR CONVENTIONAL SAT [95], [99] AND PSAT
Benchmark Camouflaging (%) Accuracy (%) Conventional SAT PSAT
c432 10 99 0.8752 s 1.8153 s
c432 20 95 0.0411 s 0.3525 s
c432 50 90 0.0296 s 0.086 s
c880 10 99 1.0379 s 2.8912 s
c880 20 95 0.0406 s 1.4853 s
c880 50 90 0.0282 s 0.0733 s
apex4 10 99 0.2044 s 9.3149 s
apex4 20 95 0.1381 s 0.6618 s
des 10 99 0.2374 s 7.154 s
des 20 95 0.2675 s 0.8273 s
distances, etc. To enable a fair comparison between the con-
ventional SAT attack and PSAT, we use the same probabilistic
benchmark versions as in Sec. V-A, and we execute PSAT
likewise for 10,000 times.
2) Results: As can be seen from Fig. 11, PSAT is notably
more successful in resolving the obfuscation of the given
probabilistic circuits than the conventional attack. For exam-
ple, for 50% of all gates being probabilistic ones with an
error rate of 1%, the conventional attack succeeded only for
4.3% and 0.5% of the 10,000 attack runs on c432 and c880
respectively. In contrast, PSAT holds a success rate of 100%
for those cases. PSAT can resolve the underlying obfuscation
with fewer errors, that is, the inferred key is more accurate,
and the behavior of the recovered IP matches matches more
closely the original IP. This is particularly the case for larger
ranges of obfuscation using probabilistic gates. For example,
for 50% of all gates being probabilistic ones with an error
rate of 1%, the circuit c432 as recovered by the conventional
attack has an HD and OER of 11.5% and 33.1%, whereas the
same circuit as recovered by PSAT has an improved HD and
OER of 7.5% and 23.0%, respectively. However, also PSAT
it is challenged once the error rate of the probabilistic gates
increases to 10%. That is because, for such a large error rate, it
is difficult to establish dominant patterns from the probabilistic
oracle. We observe similar results for apex4 and des, which
are not illustrated here due to lack of space.
These results reinforce our earlier argument on the trade-
off between accuracy, power, and security against SAT attacks.
It is important to note that with excessive errors (of 10% or
more), the computational accuracy is rather low, limiting the
practicability of such overly imprecise circuits to begin with.
3) Runtime: Table X shows the average runtime incurred
by conventional SAT [95], [99] and PSAT, for few selected
configurations, and across 10,000 runs. As expected, there
are some runtime overheads due to Monte Carlo sampling,
but also note the following. First, the user/attacker is free to
select less/more than 1,000 sampling runs; runtime overheads
are controllable. Second, the average runtime overheads are
about 11.6X (across all configurations). Third, the reported
runtimes account already for the final sampling runs (using
10,000 patterns, without loss of generality), for HD and OER
evaluation, which is not required for the conventional SAT
attack. Overall, the runtimes and computational cost of PSAT
can be considered affordable.
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Fig. 12. Success rate (left axis, red) versus Hamming distance (HD, right axis,
blue) for PSAT tackling circuits embedded with some polymorphic gates.
C. PSAT on Polymorphic Circuits
Consider an embedded, reconfigurable design with dynamic
time-sharing circuitry. That is, a single circuit is tailored to
perform all required operations serially on a time-sharing
basis. Such “template circuitry” can be readily implemented
when leveraging the runtime polymorphism of GSHE-based
circuits. Moreover, operating the GSHE gates in the proba-
bilistic regime would reduce the power consumption as well,
rendering such circuitry a viable scheme for low-power and
error-tolerant Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications [100].
For such a scenario, even an advanced attack like PSAT may
become ineffective. That is because of the underlying principle
of Monte Carlo sampling, which renders PSAT relatively
slow, depending on how many times each input pattern is
to be evaluated and how fast the oracle can be physically
queried. Hence, for any iteration of the PSAT attack, the
reconfigurable GSHE circuitry might have already morphed
from one logic structure to another, resulting in an inconsistent
oracle behavior. In turn, this is likely to induce unsatisfiable
assignments for the SAT model, causing PSAT to fail.
1) Experimental Setup: Prior setups are used as a baseline
here. We generate polymorphic versions of the benchmark
circuits c432 and c880 as follows. First, to provide a fair
baseline, we re-apply the same random selection of gates
as when picking 10% for probabilistic gates in Sec. V-A
and Sec. V-B. Next, we configure each of those gates as
polymorphic GSHE gates, while also accounting for their true
functionality, to avoid excessive overall errors. That is, any
NAND, AND, NOR, OR, XOR, or XNOR gate is replaced
by a polymorphic NAND/AND/NOR/OR/XOR/XNOR gate,
whereas the original functionality has a probability of 66.67%
assigned, and all other functions a probability of 6.67%. Like-
wise, any INV or BUF is replaced by a polymorphic INV/BUF,
whereas the original functionality has a probability of 66.67%
assigned as well. We extend our PSAT framework [99] to
account for such polymorphic behavior. Using these baseline
benchmarks containing 10% polymorphic gates, we derive
further benchmarks with 9% down to 1% polymorphic gates,
in steps of 1%. We do so by randomly selecting polymorphic
gates and reverting them to regular gates. Like in the prior
setups, we execute PSAT 10,000 times for each benchmark.
2) Results: As one would expect, PSAT can successfully
resolve smaller scales of polymorphic obfuscation (Fig. 12).
For larger scales, however, the success rate is limited. For those
cases where PSAT is successful, we also observe larger HD
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Fig. 13. Concept for a counter-based security mechanism. The input lines
hold a counter to monitor suspicious pattern insertion. For clarity, the GSHE
device has been laid out horizontally.
values than for the probabilistic scenario in Sec. V-B. That is
because polymorphic gates tend to induce larger overall errors.
Similar to the probabilistic scenario, there is a trade-off
between accuracy, power, and attack resilience. While these
experiments have shown a strong resilience against PSAT, we
caution that once polymorphic gates were used in a more
predictable manner (as for example envisioned above for some
embedded and reconfigurable design), an attacker could tailor
PSAT accordingly. Thus, once the designer seeks to employ
polymorphic gates while keeping the error in bounds, there
may be further protection measures required.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Error Control for Probabilistic Circuits
Here we envision a mechanism to detect repetitive sampling
and to subsequently scramble the statistical properties of the
GSHE circuit at runtime. For example, consider the modified
circuit c17 in Fig. 13, with three probabilistic NAND gates.
The error rates for the primary outputs O1 and O2 can be
altered by tuning the MTJ voltages of the GSHE gate in the
previous stage (recall Sec. III-A). This feature is exploited
in the conceptional feedback mechanism in Fig. 13, where
a counter array placed at the primary inputs checks the
applied input patterns for overly repetitive patterns (or any
other deviation from the expected, application-specific inputs
distribution, for that matter). In case such suspicious behavior
is observed, the feedback mechanism shall dynamically adapt
the MTJ voltage supply for the middle GSHE gate. This would
alter this gate’s output current and, in turn, impact the error
rate for the following two GSHE gates. Those latter two gates
then directly impact the overall circuit error rate, which can
thwart advanced attacks such as PSAT.
The feedback mechanism itself should be implemented
using deterministic but obfuscated GSHE gates which could
help to obstruct removal attacks. Moreover, the feedback
mechanism should be integrated into the circuit in such a
way that even advanced removal attacks would result in
fully stochastic circuit behavior. For example, the mechanism
could be implemented such that removing it would also cut
off the control current for the GSHE gates, which leads to
unpredictable behavior of those gates.
B. Other Advanced Attack Schemes
Besides our PSAT framework [99], we acknowledge that
other attack schemes might be extended as well toward re-
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Fig. 14. Delay distributions of selected IBM superblue circuits. For clarity,
the paths with the critical delays are marked with crosses.
solving obfuscation in probabilistic and polymorphic circuits.
Although tailored to attack SAT-resilient schemes, AppSAT,
which was recently proposed by Shamsi et al. [53], is of
particular interest. That is because AppSAT is based on the
probably-approximately-correct (PAC) paradigm, which can
tolerate some errors.5 However, the attack is still relying on a
consistent oracle behavior—an assumption which probabilistic
circuits do not adhere to. At the time of writing, the source
code of AppSAT has not been available to us; hence, we
were unable to incorporate modeling of probabilistic and
polymorphic circuit behavior into AppSAT.
More broadly, machine learning is increasingly being used
for both developing new attacks (e.g., [101]–[104]) and to
defend against attacks (e.g., [105]). Whether machine learn-
ing attacks will be sufficiently robust and capable against
probabilistic and polymorphic obfuscation schemes, however,
remains to be seen. For our scheme, we would like to point
out that (i) the GSHE device experiences thermally induced
stochasticity, i.e., truly random behavior [16], (ii) the error
rate for any device can be tuned individually, and (iii) those
individual error distributions superpose with each other while
they propagate throughout the entire circuit.
C. Case Study for Securing Hybrid GSHE-CMOS Circuits
Finally, we outline the prospects for securing industrial
circuits using a hybrid GSHE-CMOS approach. While the
manufacturing of spin devices is still in nascent stages [106]–
[108], such a hybrid approach appears practical, given the
CMOS-compatible processing of spin devices [12], [17],
[106].
On the one hand, recall that the delay for the GSHE device
is larger than for regular CMOS devices (Sec. III-B). On
the other hand, note that large industrial circuits tend to
exhibit a skewed distribution of timing paths, with most paths
imposing short delays, and only a few paths inducing critical
delays (Fig. 14). Here we explore a delay-aware approach
for protecting the industrial IBM superblue circuits [97].6 In
short, we replace CMOS gates in the non-critical paths with
5Shamsi et al. tackle so-called compound schemes, e.g., [46], [47]. These
schemes combine regular, large-error obfuscation techniques with provably
secure, low-error obfuscation techniques. Shamsi et al. have shown that PAC
can help to reduce these schemes to their low-error obfuscation component.
6To process the layouts for the IBM superblue circuits, we leverage scripts
provided by Kahng et al. [109]. Being sequential circuits, we also have to
pre-process them (to mimic access to the scan chains for the SAT attacks):
the inputs (and outputs) of any flip-flop are transformed into pseudo-primary
outputs (and inputs), whereupon the flip-flops can be removed.
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an obfuscated, deterministic GSHE primitive, as long as no
delay overheads are incurred. Doing so, we can obfuscate on
average 5–15% of all the gates in the benchmarks.
Conducting the conventional SAT attacks [50], [95] on
those GSHE-augmented (but fully deterministic) designs, we
observe that they cannot be resolved within 240 hours. In
fact, most attack trials incur computational limitations as
previously indicated in Sec. IV-C. Although we select the IBM
superblue circuits here to showcase our delay-aware GSHE-
CMOS hybrid camouflaging technique, this approach can be
applied to secure any large-scale circuit at little delay cost.
VII. CONCLUSION
Imprecise computing is rapidly gaining traction due to its
attractive low-power characteristics. In this paper, we present
the first study exploring the hardware security prospects of
imprecise computing systems, specifically for probabilistic and
polymorphic circuits constructed with noisy GSHE gates. We
design a GSHE-based primitive for IP protection by means of
layout obfuscation. We provide not only a thorough security
analysis for this primitive, mainly using conventional SAT
attacks and our advanced attack PSAT, but we also discuss the
inherent resilience of the GSHE device against side channel at-
tacks. A key finding of this study is the following trade-off: the
lower the accuracy of imprecise gates, the lower their power
consumption, and the better their resilience. Since any design
may have practical limitations on the error tolerance, we also
promote large-scale obfuscation in the deterministic regime.
That is underpinned by another key finding of this study,
namely that large-scale obfuscation can be competitive against
provably secure schemes. Overall, we demonstrate imprecise
computing, magnetic devices, and large-scale obfuscation as
promising candidates for security-aware design requirements.
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